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Stages of a Director’s Tenure: Implications for Monitoring 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: 
The purpose of this research is to a gain greater understanding of whether a director’s 
behaviour changes with their time on a board, and how any changes impact their ability to 
monitor effectively.  
Approach: 
Using an interpretive case-study approach we establish patterns in director behaviour at 
varying levels of tenure in order to understand whether (and how) capacity to monitor evolves 
over a director’s time on a board.  
Findings: 
We find tenure generally increases a director’s ability to understand firm specific issues, yet 
the extent and speed to which an individual director is able to monitor effectively varies 
according to each director’s experiences and competing commitments. Second, tenure can 
introduce inhibitors to effective monitoring through reduced effort and an attachment to the 
past. Finally, although tenure may obstruct independence, its effect appears contextual 
relationship dependent. 
Research implications: 
Our findings challenge the theoretical assumption that director independence and director 
knowledge are in opposition suggesting a trade-off between these two essential monitoring 
characteristics is not a necessary outcome of tenure. 
Practical implications: 
Our findings indicate the relationship between tenure and monitoring is more complex than 
generally thought and a simple one-size-fits-all approach to director tenure (such as a capped 
maximum tenure) may not be appropriate.  
Originality / Value: 
These findings highlight the value of directly investigating director behaviour at an individual 
level. 
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Introduction 
“It takes a long time to cook good board members" (Independent director) 
The question of what types of people make the best directors has been widely debated in the 
corporate governance literature (Johnson et al., 2012). An equally important but less 
understood question is once appointed, how long should a non-executive director serve on a 
board? (Dou et al., 2015). While this question has been widely debated in the literature as well 
as in practice, a lack of consensus remains.  
Globally, some regulators have recommended term maximums for directors (for example, 
France stipulates a maximum of 12 years), while regulatory bodies in others countries such 
as UK and Australia recommend boards assess the independence of any non-executive 
director who has been on the board for more than a set period of time (9 years in the UK and 
10 years in Australia). Investors too are concerned with prolonged director tenure (Hillman et 
al., 2011), while the international ISS governance rating system, Quickscore, views director 
tenure of more than 9 years to be excessive. 
It is generally accepted that time spent on a board reduces information asymmetry, 
increasing firm knowledge and enhancing a director’s ability to judge management 
performance (Roberts et al., 2005; Kim and Yang, 2014). However, under an agency theory 
rationale it is thought that over time director independence is compromised together with the 
ability to effectively monitor and control (Vafeas, 2003). These two opposing consequences 
of director tenure suggest a necessary trade-off between knowledge and independence and a 
non-linear relationship between director tenure and director monitoring (Veltrop et al., 2015; 
Castro et al., 2009; Musteen et al., 2010). Yet despite the interest in this relationship, the 
literature remains unclear as to when the tipping point occurs - if at all. 
Prior research into board composition has generally relied on secondary and archival 
evidence. While these studies have contributed to the wider debate of how board structure 
increases firm effectiveness, this approach has been criticised for failing to provide 
meaningful insight into how boards actually operate (Dalton and Dalton, 2005; Machold and 
Farquar, 2013). In addition, since board functioning is typically investigated using aggregated 
director characteristics (for example board tenure), such studies ignore the differential effects 
of individual directors on board performance (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Veltrop et al., 2015).  
In this study we adopt an alternative approach and empirically investigate director 
behaviours using primary sources. Drawing from in-depth interviews, peer feedback and 
boardroom observations we establish patterns in director behaviour at varying levels of tenure 
to describe how a director’s capacity to monitor evolves over their time on a board. In doing 
so we contribute to a growing body of research interested in the question of whether, and if 
so how, director tenure impacts on board performance outcomes such as monitoring. Finally, 
by departing from mainstream governance research we contribute to a small yet growing body 
of literature aimed at opening the black box of board research and deepen our understanding 
of how boards actually function (Pugliese et al., 2015; Machold and Farquar, 2013; Pye and 
Pettigrew 2005). 
Our findings make three contributions to the literature alongside potential implications 
to practice. First, we provide support to the idea that tenure increases a director’s 
understanding of firm specific issues and show that extent and speed to which a director is 
able to monitor is also dependent on other variables such as director experiences and 
competing professional commitments. This suggests studies should be cautious when 
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expecting a change to board composition to lead to an immediate change in board (and firm) 
performance. Second, we find the relationship between tenure and monitoring may not be 
linear, yet the reason is unlikely to be independence related and more often a result of 
alternative monitoring inhibitors such as a disengagement from board matters and a bias to 
past practices. We find tenure may obstruct independence but its effect appears contextual 
and dependent on overlapping relationships with a CEO or other long term directors.  
Overall our findings challenge the theoretical assumption that director independence and 
director knowledge are in opposition and suggest a trade-off between these two essential 
monitoring characteristics is not a necessary outcome of tenure. Finally, our findings indicate 
the relationship between tenure and monitoring is more complex than generally thought and 
a simple one-size-fits-all approach to director tenure (such as a capped maximum tenure) may 
not be appropriate.  
Director Monitoring role  
In order to understand the effects of director tenure on director monitoring it is necessary to 
first understand what is meant by director monitoring. In the following section we provide an 
overview of the literature and discuss the obstacles to understanding what constitutes effective 
monitoring. 
A primary responsibility for boards of directors is to ensure the best interests of the 
company are being pursued through effective monitoring of management on behalf of the 
owners. (Hambrick et al., 2015; Hermalin, 2005; Fama, 1980). As legal representative of the 
owners, board of directors are expected to evaluate and ratify major strategic decisions to 
ensure alignment to the owner’s best interest and minimise the costs that arise from a 
separation of ownership and decision control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). As the highest 
decision making body with the organisation, boards of directors are also tasked with the 
compensation, evaluation and where necessary dismissal of the CEO (Conyon and Peck, 
1998; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009).  
Given the perceived importance of the monitoring role, scholars across an array of 
disciplines, including management, accounting, finance and law, have sort to understand how 
boards can monitor more effectively. In this pursuit researchers have proposed numerous 
adjustments to board structure - the most prominent being an increase in the proportion of 
independent directors. The rationale in advocating director independence stems from an 
agency theory logic which considers independent directors to be removed from CEO 
influence and therefore more capable of vigilant monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This 
perception has also gained prominence with regulators. For example, listed firms in the US 
are mandated to compose their boards with a majority of independent outside directors 
(Kaufman and Englander, 2005). Similarly in Australia, a majority of independent directors 
(including the chair) is recommended through the ASX Corporate Governance Guidelines.  
Other structural changes thought to enhance board monitoring include reduced board size, 
which is thought to increase director accountability (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Yermack, 
1996), the separation of the CEO and Chair role (Goh, 2009; Jensen, 1993) and the existence 
and composition of board committees such as the audit committee, remuneration and 
nomination committees (Klein, 2002; Beasley et al., 2009). While a large volume of research 
has investigated structural characteristics of boards, overall the literature has failed to find 
consensus on whether they are effective in increasing firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Bhagat and Black, 2001). 
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A smaller yet growing body of research examine effective monitoring through director 
behaviours and monitoring activities (e.g. Tuggle et al., 2010; Machold and Farquar, 2013). 
This stream of research considers monitoring to be a process that directors engage in and 
effective monitoring to be derived through behaviours rather than board structure (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999; Hambrick et al., 2015; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
Consistent with this stream of research is the notion that directors require the ability and 
motivation to monitor. Hambrick et al., (2015) broke down the construct of ability and define 
it as (1) the capability to be objective, (2) the knowledge to understand firm issues and (3) the 
capacity to devote time and attention. They further note that effective monitors require both 
ability and motivation and that these cannot be substituted for one another.  
Since independent non-executive directors are dependent on the information they receive 
their ability to monitor comes through active participation in board matters. Director 
monitoring behaviours include requesting information, questioning, challenging and inquiring 
(Hooghiemstra and van Manen, 2004; Roberts et al., 2005; Petrovic, 2008; Ofstein et al., 2005). 
The importance of these behaviours for monitoring is well explained by Hambrick et al., if 
directors sense a problem, they ask about it; if not satisfied, they ask about it again and ask 
fellow directors what they think” (2015, p. 327). 
A further obstacle to understanding monitoring effectiveness is that the process of 
monitoring is largely unobservable. Consequently studies frequently measure board 
monitoring at a board or firm level using proxies such as CEO remuneration, financial 
reporting quality or through the effectiveness of firm strategic choices. This practice, which 
is aided by the availability of secondary data on board governance, is often criticised for 
failing to control for the multitude of endogenous and exogenous factors that can also 
influence a firm’s performance and decision making process (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; 
Pettigrew, 1992). As a result there have been calls for more direct measurements of board 
monitoring (Finkelstein et al., 2009) but as yet the literature has not agreed on any reliable 
measurement of monitoring behaviour at a director level (Hambrick et al., 2015).   
Director Tenure in the Literature 
The interest in director tenure within the corporate governance literature has come from the 
more general discussion of board structure and the logic that independent directors make the 
most vigilant monitors (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Tuggle et al., 2010). Since over 
time directors’ form ties to management, it is often considered that over time their ability to 
monitor objectively may be compromised (Hillman et al., 2011; Daily and Dalton, 1994). 
Meanwhile, as time elapses, directors also form more informed views about the firm. 
Therefore, at some point there might be conflicting expectations in terms of reduced 
independence and increased knowledge. 
While this is a common view, and one that has been adopted by regulators, the factors that 
influence independence in non-executive directors are subject to debate (Petrovic, 2008). For 
example, some argue independence is a state of mind rather than an objective characteristic 
and as such directors can be close to management and still retain independent judgment of 
executive decisions (Roberts et al., 2005; Shen, 2003).  
Agency theorists argue long tenured non-executive directors may be less willing to 
enquire, challenge and resist the influence of the CEO and top management (Vafeas, 2003, 
Dalton et al., 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As a consequence long tenured directors are 
more likely to support management interests at the expense of shareholders (Kesner, 1988; 
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Wade et al., 1990; Goodstein and Boeker, 1991; Vafeas, 2003). In support of this view Sharma 
and Iselin (2012) point to the presence of long-tenured directors on the boards of scandal-
ridden firms such as Enron, Tyco, Worldcom and Xerox. Long standing directors may also 
be perceived as less effective monitors by shareholders (Hillman et al., 2011). 
On the other hand the information asymmetry between management and non-executive 
directors is reduced over a director’s tenure thereby removing a critical obstacle to effective 
monitoring.  Independent directors are less informed than executive directors (Bhagat and 
Black, 2001; Roberts et al., 2005). With tenure comes an increase in rich board information 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a), essential for effective monitoring. For example, Roberts et al., (2005) 
point out that a non-executive director can only be active in questioning, challenging, 
inquiring and probing once they have adequate knowledge of a firm and its operations. 
Knowledge asymmetry is particularly high when a director first joins a board. New 
members need to learn about organisational practices and gain familiarity with the 
organisation before they can contribute fully. An added challenge is the infrequency and 
limited time that boards meet. Consequently newcomers to boards are thought to be less 
vigilant monitors and less likely to challenge management (Beasley, 1996; Dunn, 2004; 
Muller-Kahle and Llewlyn, 2011). As a non-executive director’s tenure increases, they 
accumulate greater experience and knowledge. This in turn enhances their capacity to 
understand firm related issues and judge management performance (Zald, 1969; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2008; Vafes, 2003; Beasley, 1996; Kosnik, 1990).  
The relationship between director tenure and board monitoring has been empirically tested 
within the audit committee literature with mixed results. For example, Sharma and Iselin 
(2012) find board audit committees with long tenured directors (defined as nine or more years 
of service) are more likely to positively misstate income, suggesting long tenured directors 
are beholden to management and less able to exercise independent judgement. Similarly, 
Bedard et al., (2004) show the average tenure of audit committee members is positively 
associated with earnings management. Conversely, other scholars find board audit 
committees with long tenured directors (defined as directors with 10 or more years of service) 
have improved financial reporting quality evident through lower instances of earnings 
management, arguing time on a board increases a director’s understanding of firm related 
accounting issues enabling them to monitor financial reports more effectively (Liu and Sun, 
2010; Chan, Liu and Sun, 2013). 
Kim and Yang (2014) extend this literature in a study of the relationship between board 
tenure and monitoring. They find a positive association between average board member tenure 
and financial reporting quality, concluding the positive effects of increased board member 
tenure – i.e. enhanced firm knowledge – offset any reduction of monitoring through decreased 
independence.  
Other scholars point to long tenured directors as less diligent monitors using excessive 
CEO compensation as a proxy for poor monitoring (eg. Vafeas, 2003; Byrd and Cooperman, 
2010). This relationship is found to be more significant when long tenured directors sit on the 
remuneration committee (Hoitash, 2011) and when a CEO has a tenure of six years or more 
(Byrd and Cooperman, 2010). In contrast, Kim et al., (2014) find long tenured directors to be 
more effective at managing CEO compensation. They explain time on a board increases a 
director’s access to ‘soft information’ enabling them to better monitor and assess CEO 
performance. A similar argument was used by Tian et al., (2011) to explain findings of a 
positive relationship between tenure and market reaction to CEO selection, suggesting that 
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board’s with longer tenured directors are better able to interpret the firm’s strategic needs and 
are therefore better equipped to select a new CEO. 
A further obstacle to advancing our understanding on tenure consequences comes from 
the lack of an accepted measurement for director tenure (Byrd and Cooperman, 2010). While 
it is common for tenure related studies to aggregate individual tenure to the board level using 
an average of non-executive board member tenure (eg. Kim et al., 2014), scholars have noted 
this simple summary statistic can be problematic as it ignores the dispersion of member tenure 
within the board (Dou et al., 2015; Vafeas, 2003; Smith et al., 1994). An alternative measure 
of operationalising tenure using a percentage of directors with more or less than X years of 
service is similarly problematic since X is an arbitrary number and has differed between 
studies. For example Dou et al., (2015) use 15 years as a cut off for long tenured directors 
while Sharma and Iselin (2012) use 9 years. Finally, while it is common for studies to use the 
number of years a director has served on a board as a proxy for that director’s (in) dependence, 
some studies use the appointment date of the CEO to the board to determine the level of 
director independence – for example directors appointed before the CEO are seen to have a 
greater level of independent than directors appointed after the CEO (e.g. de Villiers et al., 
2011; Rutherford and Buchholz, 2007). These inconsistencies in tenure measurement could 
find the same director characterised as both dependent and independent depending on the 
measure. 
Overall the relationship between director tenure and director monitoring within the 
corporate governance literature remains unclear due to two divergent perspectives pointing to 
a trade-off between gained knowledge and reduced independence. Our understanding is 
further limited by the difficulty in reconciling prior results that apply different measures of 
director tenure.  
Study Context – Australian Financial Services Industry 
This study is based on the perceptions, experiences and behaviours of non-executive directors 
who sit on boards of Australian financial service companies. We selected the financial 
services industry as our research setting as it is a complex industry with a strong focus on 
compliance. As a result the role of the board is heavily weighted toward monitoring, enabling 
us to glean meaningful insight into director monitoring behaviour and address our primary 
research question, do the monitoring behaviours of non-executive directors change over the 
time spent on a board?  
The financial service industry in Australia is regulated by the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA). The APRA code of governance requires the chairperson along 
with a majority of directors to be independent of management. Although the code does not 
directly address tenure, it requires complying boards to have a policy for board renewal 
that gives consideration to whether directors have served on the board for a period that may 
compromise their independence. 
Initially two focal boards were selected from the financial services industry (we have 
named these Board A and Board B). These boards were interested in participating in our 
research in return for feedback on the functioning of their boards (Bezemer et al., 2014). 
Selecting boards from the same industry reduces complexity in the research and allows for a 
control of environmental differences (Bezemer et al., 2014; Yin, 2004, Pugliese et al., 2015). 
On the other hand it is useful to seek variation between cases to allow for contrasting results 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Drawing from these two sampling strategies the selected boards 
share similarities – they are both member based organisations operating within the financial 
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services industry - yet they differ in their primary service (one retail financial services, the 
other superannuation) as well as in their organisational size (for example in asset base and 
employee number). In order to provide greater support to the findings from our initial round 
of data collection we recruited a further three boards operating within the Australian financial 
services industry (Board C, D and E). All participating directors except one is classified as 
non-executive director. Profiles for each of the five boards are summarised in table 1. Profiles 
for each participating director are provided in table 2.  
Table 1: Board profiles 
Board 
Code 
Primary service Board 
size 
Assets 
$’mil 
Membership 
base 
A Financial services 6 190 4,200 
B Superannuation 6 1,000 600,000 
C Health Insurance 10 120 27,000 
D Financial services 7 1,000 70,000 
E Financial services 8 300 15,000 
 
Table 2: Participating director profiles 
Board 
Code 
Director 
Code 
Tenure 
years 
Gender Board 
Code 
Director 
Code 
Tenure 
years 
Gender 
A A1 22 M D D1 11 F 
A A2 26 M D D2 3 M 
A A3 2 M D D3 40 M 
A A4 1.5 M D D4 7 F 
A A5 1.5 F D D5 19 M 
A A61 10 M D D6 6 M 
B B1 8 M D D7 17 M 
B B2 5 M E E1 26 M 
B B3 2 M E E2 5 M 
B B4 1 F E E3 3 M 
B B5 0.5 M E E4 29 M 
B B6 10 M E E5 8 M 
C C1 10 M E E6 6 M 
C C2 18 M E E7 41 M 
C C3 17 F E E8 7 M 
C C4 10 F     
C C5 8 M     
C C6 10 M     
C C7 7 M     
C C8 13 M     
C C9 5 F     
C C10 3 M     
1 Inside director 
 
Data collection 
To address the overarching research question of whether (and how) a director’s monitoring 
behaviour changes over time, we adopted an interpretive case-study approach drawing data 
from a number of data sources. This approach allowed us to gather insights and patterns 
regarding the research phenomenon from multiple aspects. Furthermore multiple data 
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collection enables data triangulation providing stronger substantiation of our findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b). Data collection methods and data sources are described below and 
summarised in table 3.  
Tenure Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with each non-executive directors from our two 
focal boards (Boards A and B) to explore their insights, perceptions and experiences of 
director tenure consequences for monitoring. Interview participants included two women and 
10 men and ranged in current tenure from six months to 26 years, providing a good spread of 
experience on current and previous boards. Participants were asked questions such as, “Do 
you think your time on the board has changed your ability / willingness to question and 
challenge management? – if so, how” and “Do you think your time on the board has altered 
your ability to remain objective? - if so, how”. Participants were encouraged to give examples 
to support their answers. All tenure related interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. 
The interview protocol is included in Appendix A.  
Boardroom observations 
We observed committee meetings (3) and board meetings (3) of the two focal boards. 
Committee meetings averaged two hours and general meetings ranged in duration from two 
to five hours. In total we observed director behaviour and participation in more than 15 hours 
of board meetings. Board A allowed us to video-record all meetings, Board B only permitted 
us to take in-meeting field notes. This was sufficient to observe general director behaviours 
and record specific instances of monitoring and participation of each director. Being present 
during meetings that were both videoed and not videoed also allowed us to ascertain that while 
the presence of the cameras was noticeable the meetings that were videoed were conducted 
in a typical manner. Similarly our presence during meetings did not appear to interfere with 
meeting proceedings. Participants could ask us to stop filming or leave the room at any time, 
only Board B requested this on two occasions while they discussed of an impending legal 
matter.  Two researchers attended each of the meetings. This enriched the data by allowing 
insights to be compared and contrasted and different perspectives investigated. During each 
meeting the two researchers took general field notes of how each director contributed to 
boardroom discussions including the agenda item and the type of contribution (for example, 
a question, a comment, a challenge) as well as how a director’s input was received by the 
remaining board members. Structural observations of director monitoring behaviour and 
participation in board discussions was conducted using an observation schedule. Since it 
would have been difficult to code all behaviours during a meeting as well as record general 
observations, we assigned behaviour coding to a sample of discussions (two minutes each ten 
minute period). At the conclusion of the meeting the coded behaviours were compared 
between the two researchers to check for coding reliability. The schedule used to code 
behaviours during observations is included in Appendix B. 
Peer performance feedback interviews 
To gain verification of participant experiences shared during interviews, directors from our 
five participating boards gave verbal performance feedback and a performance rating for each 
of their fellow board member’s. We asked each director to describe, in relation to their fellow 
board members: what they did well, where they could improve and to provide rating out of 10 
for their overall director effectiveness. This resulted in a rich data-set from which we could 
profile the peer-rated performance of 36 directors across five boards which. When compared 
to their tenure this provided insightful support and verification of data collected during 
interviews and observations. Since this information was considered to be sensitive in its nature 
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these interviews were not audio-recorded. Instead field notes were taken by two researchers 
which allowed for comparison to ensure a reliable record was documented.  
Secondary data sources 
We used available data sources to profile each director and each board. These sources 
included linkedin profiles, newspaper articles, websites and annual reports. Data obtained 
from these sources helped us to understand the experiences, functional background and 
competing commitments of each director, as well as historical context for each board. This 
information provided a useful framework to prepare for interviews and boardroom 
observations and to interpret our findings.    
Table 3: Data collection methods and data sources 
Method Data source Collection technique Research Objective 
Tenure Interviews 12 directors Field notes, audio-recording 
and transcriptions 
Explore director experiences 
and perceptions of tenure 
consequences 
 
Peer performance 
feedback interviews 
37 directors Field notes, peer-rating of 
effectiveness out 10 
Peer evaluation of director 
performance.  
Provide validation for 
interview and observation 
data  
 
Board room 
observations 
3 General meetings  
3 Committee meetings 
Field notes 
Video-recordings (some) 
Dual coding of director 
monitoring behaviours 
Directly observe behaviour 
and actions of directors 
Provide validation of 
interview and peer feedback 
data 
    
Secondary data Externally available 
data, internal reports, 
emails and informal 
conversations  
Field notes  
Profile participating boards and 
directors 
Provide context for data 
collection, analysis and 
interpretation of findings 
 
Data analysis 
Our analysis consisted of two phases adapted from established techniques for interpretative 
inquiry and theory building, (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Corley and Gioia, 2004; Machold and 
Farquhar, 2013). Below we provide an account of each stage separately, however the analysis 
of rich field data is an ongoing process and as such our actual process of data collection and 
data analysis frequently overlapped rather than follow discrete chronological steps (Aherns 
and Chapman, 2004). 
The first stage of our analysis involved making sense of the interview data, the peer-
performance feedback and our field notes. The transcribed data of the interviews along with 
our hand recorded notes were reviewed and re-read searching for common and divergent 
themes within cases and between cases to form a first level of open coding. To assist with our 
analysis we used NVivo 11.0 (a qualitative research software that facilitates the analysis of 
qualitative data). Codes were created to reflect the essence of the data originating from the 
language of the participants. This process of assigning and revising codes resulted in a final 
set of 25 different codes. Categories were further refined as similarities and differences were 
identified. Categories with commonalities were consolidated while single incidents or 
categories with minimal evidence were set aside and for subsequent analysis. As themes 
developed and no new insights were revealed and it was felt theoretical saturation had been 
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reached (Charmaz, 2006). Second order coding was undertaken to reassemble the data 
fractured during the open coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and given more abstract names 
reflective of the pre-existing theory around director tenure. Finally codes were aggregated 
into overarching themes reflective of the core themes of the study and providing the 
foundations for the study’s findings and conclusions. Figure 1 outlines the data coding 
structure adopted and the emergent themes that formed the basis of our findings. 
Figure 1: Data coding structure 
 
 
The second phase of data analysis involved comparing our initial findings which were 
based on director perceptions, with our own observations of director behaviour and 
participation taken from board and committee meetings. Where our observations supported 
initial findings from participant experience and perception, this stage provided richer detail to 
support our findings. Where our observations contradicted initial findings we were able to 
explore new themes and go back to the original data and literature to look for further support. 
Since we were interested in understanding discernible differences in director monitoring 
behaviours based on tenure we developed an observation schedule to record director 
monitoring behaviours detected during board meetings. We were unable to locate a suitable 
 
 
 
1st Order Concepts 2nd Order Concepts 
 
Aggregate Themes 
Need to learn dynamics 
Need to earn confidence  
Asking the obvious questions 
 
As 
Director knowledge experience 
eases transition 
 
As 
Participation limited to own 
area of expertise 
 
As Participation in matters outside 
area of expertise 
As 
Taking on board responsibility 
increases knowledge 
 
As 
Ability to expand contribution 
limited by director availability 
 
As 
Extensive knowledge of firm 
and industry 
Corporate knowledge 
 
As Frequent Challenging 
Participates in all matters 
 
As 
Board defers to in decision 
making 
Confidence to question CEO 
 
As 
Stop reading papers 
Low level of interest 
Accept the status quo 
 
As Wedded to the past 
Takes time to adapt to changes 
Knowledge out of date 
 
Monitoring inhibitors 
are cognitive and 
motivational – not 
independence related 
Long term directors remain 
objective 
CEOs turnover more often than 
directors 
As 
Reduced 
independence not an 
outcome of tenure 
 
Disengagement 
 
Stagnation 
 
Increased monitoring 
 
Low information 
asymmetry 
 
Power 
 
Competing 
commitments 
Narrow contribution 
contribution  
 
Prior experiences 
contribution  
 
Focus on fitting in 
contribution  
 
Prior experiences 
determine duration of 
‘settling-in’ period 
 
Board experiences  
Contribution changes 
in quality  
contribution  
 
Extend and speed of 
knowledge expansion 
contingent on 
experiences 
 
Monitoring capacity 
limited by competing 
commitments 
 
Long term directors 
highly valued member 
of boards, seen as 
leaders 
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coding scheme in the literature for monitoring behaviours so we developed our own coding 
scheme based on behaviours commonly associated with monitoring in the literature. For 
example, it is frequently noted that effective monitoring comes through active questioning, 
challenging and inquiring (Hambrick et al., 2015; Roberts et al., 2005; Petrovic, 2008). We 
limited our coding to questions and comments, excluding contributions that involved 
presenting data, facilitating the meeting or were social in nature. Specifically, questions were 
coded as either (i) confirming a directors understanding of a topic, (ii) inquiring further into 
a topic, or (iii) requesting further information. Comments were coded as (i) adding new 
information to a topic, (ii) supporting current discussions or proposal or (iii) opposing current 
discussion or proposal. 
Findings 
Our study set out to explore whether director monitoring behaviour changes over their time 
on a board - and if so, how?  To make sense of our data and explore if and how tenure impacts 
director monitoring, we categorized the stages within a director’s tenure. We found new 
directors begin with a stage of settling-in before moving through a period of knowledge-
expansion and finally (some directors) enter a stage of leadership. However, not all directors 
follow the same path and there is potential for monitoring decline at two distinct phases of a 
director’s tenure. First, early to mid-term directors may become disengaged, restricted by 
competing commitments that may lose interest in board matters. Second, after a prolonged 
period on a board, director performance can stagnate if directors fail to adapt to a changing 
environment, instead holding on to past practices. Each of these stages along with implications 
for monitoring are described in detail below. Table 4 provides examples drawn from our data 
to categorize the tenure stage for each 36 director’s participating in our study.   
Settling-in: new director focus on fitting-in not monitoring 
When asked to reflect on their experiences joining new boards directors unanimously agreed 
they needed time to understand board dynamics before they could monitor effectively. 
Directors described this period as a settling-in time when their attention was focused on 
understanding relationships and culture rather than participating in monitoring activities. This 
was illustrated through our participant’s discussions of their early board experiences: 
“Obviously when you join any new board you do have to take time to understand the 
dynamics of the particular board and relationships around the table and it’s good to 
sit back for a bit and get the feel for the organization” (B4) 
“The first meeting you are feeling your way …looking for body language, learning the 
lay of the land … now I know how things work I have more time to contribute” (B5) 
It became evident through discussions with directors that even experienced directors were 
confronted with a settling-in period. One director made the following comment of a newly 
joined and highly experienced director: 
“He’s an experienced director, but he’s not right into it yet. He’s doing the right thing, 
feeling his way a bit, getting to know the other directors and so on” (B1) 
The duration of a director’s settling-in period appeared to be highly variable. Some directors 
indicated it took around six months to settle in, others commented it took one to two years.  
On further investigation, it appeared the duration of a settling-in period is influenced by each 
individual’s prior experiences. Past experience as a director on other boards seems to reduce 
the time it takes for new directors to feel confident in questioning and commenting during 
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board meetings. Participants explained that having an existing knowledge of ‘what directors 
do’ makes it is easier to assimilate into a new director role;  
“Director X just slotted straight in because he’s a member on other boards” (A2).  
On the other hand, directors with little or no prior board experience on a board took longer to 
settle in;  
 “In my case my appointment to the board of (Board A) was my first board 
appointment therefore I was a new Director… a learning curve was required to get to 
myself up to speed” (A2) 
Participant experiences were supported by our direct observations during board meetings 
where it was not always obvious the tenure of a director based on their behaviour alone. This 
is illustrated by the narrative below taken from our observations:  
A new director on Board B had limited prior director experience – he introduced 
himself as being “new” despite being on the board for over two years. His behaviour 
during meetings reflected his feelings of newness – he participated the least of all 
board members and his questions were aimed at clarifying information rather 
challenging management on matters. In contrast another director on Board B, with 
tenure of just one year, yet with significant prior board experience, contributed highly 
and meaningfully during all observed board meetings. We observed a high level of 
participation and instances of challenging management and little evidence of the 
behaviours generally assumed for “new” directors.  
It has been reflected in the literature that new directors take some time to come up to speed 
(Beasley, 1996; Dunn, 2004; Muller-Kahle and Llewyln, 2011), however many empirical 
studies into board composition fail to take account of this settling-in period and the time it 
takes for new directors to have a positive impact on board monitoring. Our findings show 
directors do transition through a phase of settling in where involvement in board tasks may 
be low. As such caution should be taken when modelling the effect of changes to board 
composition on board performance to account for this lag. This is further complicated by our 
finding that the duration of settling-on can be significantly different for each director 
depending on their prior experiences.  
Knowledge expansion: over time directors expand in their breadth of monitoring capacity  
Participants agreed, the main outcome of tenure on a director’s ability to monitor is a 
corresponding expansion in their knowledge of the firm, the industry and management 
performance. Interestingly it was noted by more than one director that the change in director 
participation over this time was evident not in the quantity of participation but rather in the 
quality of director monitoring. For example, when reflecting on the changing behaviours of 
their colleagues during  board meetings, one board member pointed out an observable change 
over time was in the quality of their questioning and comments; 
“The value of their contribution has lifted and not necessarily by more but what they 
say is more relevant and it’s more intuitive and it’s more um…more on the money ...  
Early on you can say things because ‘gee it’s been a whole board meeting and I 
haven’t asked a question so I need to ask a question, what’s it going to be’ … So it’s 
the quality of the questioning or the comments that get much better over time I think 
and that comes with confidence sometimes too, from having a little bit more familiarity 
with the people and management and the business.”(A6) 
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Table 4: Stages of director tenure and examples of peer-feedback 
 
  
Director 
Code 
Tenure 
years 
Peer 
rating4 
Tenure level Peer feedback example 
A11 19 8.5 Leadership “Across everything, understands the environment” 
A22 16 9.0 Leadership “Decision maker, detailed, very capable and hard-working” 
A3 2.0 7.0 Disengagement “Doesn’t appear to always read papers prior to the meeting” 
A42 1.5 7.7 Narrow  “Still developing an understanding of the industry” 
A52 1.5 7.3 Narrow  “Lacks experience but her contribution has grown positively” 
B11 8 7.8 Broad “Has a good depth of knowledge” 
B23 5 6.5 Narrow “Could think in more broader terms” 
B3 2 6.7 Settling In “Would like to see him put forward his thoughts more” 
B42 1 8.3 Broad “An expert in her field but also contributes in other areas” 
B5 0.5 7.0 Settling In “He’s not right into it yet.  He’s doing the right thing, feeling his 
way a bit, getting to know the other Directors and so on” 
B62 10 8.0 Leadership “Constructive and knowledgeable, strives for answers” 
C11 10 7.8 Leadership “Extremely conscientious and dedicated. He’s not worried about 
telling CEO what he thinks” 
C2 18 7.9 Leadership “Great strength is his total fearlessness and willingness to question 
something he’s unsure about” 
C3 17 6.8 Narrow  “Could improve technical knowledge of industry, could be more 
strategic” 
C42 10 8.3 Broad  “Has a breadth and depth of knowledge and skills” 
C5 8 5.8 Disengagement “He seems a bit too detached. Rarely suggests an alternative action 
or debate anything.” 
C6 10 7.4 Broad  “Really good legal mind but also has a lot of experience dealing 
with (our industry)” 
C7 7 7.6 Broad  “He’s clearly reading the papers, picking up details in papers that 
are worth pointing out” 
C82 13 7.3 Narrow  “Not a lot of corporate knowledge depth. She talks confidently about 
marketing strategy. Audit and risk not really her areas” 
C9 5 7.6 Narrow  “Still coming to grips with some aspects of (our industry). Asks a 
lots of questions” 
C10 3 8.4 Leadership “Has enormous power and respect. Very experienced” 
D12 11 8.0 Leadership “Taking the lead in discussions. Is across all the stuff. Challenging 
and asking more from management” 
D2 3 9.0 Broad “He knows his stuff, very good networks so we know what’s 
happening in industry” 
D33 40 5.3 Stagnation “Not a lot of recent experience to add to the debate. Caught in how 
we have always done things” 
D4 7 6.8 Narrow  “Needs to develop a more holistic analysis of issue” 
D51 19 7.7 Leadership “Confidence in his judgement … respected” 
D6 6 6.4 Disengagement “Don’t see a lot of him... has to question more” 
D7 17 7.3 Broad  “Has wisdom, so when there are issues it is great having his input” 
E1 26 8.1 Stagnation “Uses same logic when looking at different situation and decisions” 
E22 5 6.9 Narrow  “Technically he doesn’t have a lot of understanding of why/how 
things are happening but he’s street smart and street wise” 
E3 3 8.8 Narrow  “Brought a lot to the board. Good reputation around town, very 
connected. Just needs more experience” 
E4 29 8.2 Leadership “Wealth of industry experience. Very experienced as a board 
member” 
E5 8 6.9 Narrow  “He’s learning and he acknowledges it” 
E62 6 6.9 Disengagement “Doesn’t seem to be prepared. In strategy he speaks from his 
opinion rather than informed decision” 
E73 41 6.5 Stagnation “Since he stepped down as chair he’s had less input at board level. 
How he thinks about things is based in past” 
E81 7 8.7 Leadership “Has respect amongst his peers” 
1 Board Chair, 2 Committee Chair, 3 Former Chair, 4Peer rating is a score of perceived effectiveness out of 10  
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Our observations of director participation during board meetings highlighted another 
interesting difference in director behaviours that appeared related to their tenure. Lower 
tenured directors were more likely to question and comment on matters relating to their own 
area of expertise with limited contribution to items outside their functional background. On 
the other hand, we observed directors with longer tenure typically participated more broadly 
across agenda items.  
Our observation of a difference in the breadth of director participation was supported 
during participant interviews. Directors recalled their own experiences as well as perceptions 
of other board members growth trajectory on boards. It was generally noted that as knowledge 
of the firm operations and industry expanded, they were able to broaden their boardroom 
participation and question matters outside their own area of expertise. This trend is explained 
in the following comment where a director describes the trajectory of a fellow director. They 
explained that as the director gained a greater understanding of the firms operations, they were 
able to engage in broader board conversations including matters outside their own area of 
expertise;  
“(When he first joined the board) he was relatively stand back-ish and just listening 
and whatever … then he started coming out and started becoming more of an inputter 
to the board discussions…other areas, marketing, even though he wasn’t a marketing 
expert he got involved” (A3) 
While a general trend appeared whereby directors over time expanded in the participation 
from a narrow view (based on their own area of expertise) to a broader participation across 
agenda items, this did not always occur – nor was it expected. Through interviews, 
observations and peer feedback we identified a number of cases where directors at a mid-
range tenure (between two and six years) remained narrow in their participation. Furthermore, 
when we investigated further these directors were often rated as effective by their peers and 
although their narrow focus was noted, it was accepted that the gaps in their knowledge would 
be filled by the other board members.  
For example, in one case, a director was bought to the board to fill a specific gap in 
marketing skills. Recognising that her skills were in marketing and not in finance, the chair 
commented that he was happy for her to continue in that narrow role, noting that competing 
commitments would restrict her ability to expand her knowledge more broadly; 
“In terms of the other stuff she wasn’t recruited for that and we’re not trying to make 
her into a financial guru or an analyst, that’s not her bag.  We want her thinking about 
the marketing and we’ve got other skills on board that will compensate for that… (Her 
skills) won’t develop too far out of the marketing side of things because that’s what 
she’s doing at work, that’s what she’s doing here and we’re relying on the rest of us 
looking at where the financials are going.” (A1) 
Similarly, a number of directors appeared to remain narrow in their contribution after a 
significant amount of time on a board. In another example it was noted that a director with 13 
years of tenure remained narrow in her focus; 
“Not a lot of corporate knowledge depth. She talks confidently about marketing 
strategy. Audit and risk not really her areas” (C5)  
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Yet it was also evident she was a valued member of the board and effective monitoring 
(within her own area) and was seen as “Dynamic, smart, (good at) questioning, not frightened 
to speak up” (C10). 
The literature has noted that boards are involved in a range of tasks (Machold and Farquar, 
2013), however it is clear from the literature the extent to which directors engage in each task. 
Our findings show that while some directors engage in all tasks, some directors – in particular 
those who are new or who are restricted in their capacity to expand in their knowledge – 
remain narrow in their involvement in board tasks.  
 
Leadership:  monitoring increases when information asymmetry is low 
Our findings show directors with deep and broad knowledge of the focal firm and industry 
are perceived by their fellow board members as a leader figure. The directors we identified in 
this stage often held formal leadership roles on the board (such as Chair or Chair of a main 
committee) and while these directors often had longer tenures, this was not always the case. 
Indeed leadership qualities were found in directors with as little as three years of tenure on 
one board. The common characteristics amongst ‘leader’ directors was their deep and broad 
understanding of the firms operations, knowledge that provides them with an ability to 
contribute on any issue. Our findings show ‘leaders’ are respected by their fellow board 
members both for their deep knowledge as well as for their fearlessness in challenging and 
questioning management. Performance feedback from fellow directors included the following 
comments; 
 “(Director of 10 years) is extremely conscientious and dedicated. He’s not worried 
about telling the CEO what he thinks” (C9) 
“(Director of 19 years) knows the material, knows what is going on” (D4) 
“(Director of 11 years) takes the lead in discussions… Is across all the stuff … (She) 
is challenging and asking more from management” (D4) 
“(Director of 10 years) is constructive and knowledgeable, (he) strives for answers” 
(B3) 
 
The tenure literature is unclear on the ability for longer tenured directors to monitor 
effectively with many studies suggesting director effectiveness declines after a period of time 
on a board. Our findings show directors with long tenures (between 10 and 20 years) are often 
perceived as leaders by their fellow board members, demonstrating high level of monitoring 
behaviour. This finding supports prior studies that show boards dominated by long term 
directors monitor more intently due to their increased knowledge (Beasley, 1996; Kosnik, 
1990). However our finding is at odds with the agency based notion that longer term directors 
are less vigilant monitors due to decreased independence.  
The relationship between tenure and independence 
There is ambiguity surrounding the relationship between tenure and independence in the 
corporate governance literature (Dou et al., 2015). We therefore further examined the impact 
of tenure on independence in greater detail. Participants generally rejected the notion that 
tenure directly reduces independence from management. Rather many suggested reduced 
independence is a consequence of relationships rather than tenure alone. While some 
participants acknowledged reduced independence could be a problem in long standing 
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directors where their tenure overlapped with management, most directors indicated this was 
an uncommon occurrence since management turns over at a faster rate than directors. 
“I think it’s particularly a problem where you have a Chairperson - CEO thing going 
…I think that can be a problem, not in many cases but we’ve had some people in (this 
industry) have been the Chairs of those boards for 20-30 years and I think that’s a 
very unhealthy thing particularly where there’s a very close relationship with the 
CEO” (B6) 
In challenging to the assumption that independence reduces over time, participants 
supported the counter argument that directors with prolonged tenure could remain free of bias 
and influence. One director with 10 years on the board commented; 
 “I’d classify myself as fiercely independent of the management of X" – (B6) 
This self-assessment was supported by another director from the same board commented;  
“I think (director X with 10 years of tenure) has been a pretty good champion of ‘we’re 
not here to do that, we’re here to do this’.  So I wouldn’t say that (he has lost his 
independence from management) with him in mind” (B3) 
Disengagement: monitoring is limited by individual capacity and willingness   
Although we did not find any substantial evidence that tenure reduced a director’s 
independence, we did identify other factors that may inhibit director monitoring capability 
related to a director’s tenure. The first obstacle to monitoring – disengagement - appeared 
amongst some directors in early to mid-stage of tenure (between two and eight years). These 
directors were perceived by colleagues as being unprepared for meetings (i.e. not reading their 
board papers) accompanied by displaying a low level of interest to items outside their own 
area of expertise. Some typical comments included; 
“He seems a bit too detached. Rarely suggests an alternative action or debate 
anything.” (D1) 
“Suspect he doesn’t read papers all the time. I don’t know he adds a lot, perhaps least 
in terms of contribution. Doesn’t seem to be prepared. In strategy he speaks from his 
opinion rather than informed decision.” (E2) 
These comments and our finding is not surprising. Gaining an understanding of a firm and 
its industry takes time and requires a commitment to learning. Directors are known to be busy, 
often holding concurrent positions outside the board’s focal industry, as a consequence 
directors can lack capacity for processing new information (Boivie, 2016). In such cases our 
findings suggest these directors fail to grow in their monitoring capacity while their 
contribution to agenda items remains narrow.  
Stagnation: a decline in monitoring effectiveness can occur with time 
Our findings show that overtime director monitoring capability may decline due to a cognitive 
attachment to past activities. This was most common amongst directors with prolonged 
periods of tenure (over 25 years of tenure), an in particular once directors stepped down from 
prior positions of leadership. Comments by peers regarding these directors included;  
“(Director of 41 years) has been on the board a long time. Since he stepped down as 
chair he’s had less input at board level. He has a lot of knowledge about the industry 
in general, (but) how he thinks about things is based in past” (E5) 
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“(Director of 40 years) Not lot of recent experience to add to the debate. Caught in 
how we have always done things.”(D1) 
In another one instance a director described how a fellow board members performance 
had declined in prior years. They noted that “4 years ago he would have been a 9 (rating out 
of 10), but now he is a 6 or 7” adding that it’s difficult for a director to remain effective once 
they leave the workforce.  
 
Discussion 
Despite drawing attention from scholars and regulators, the implications for director tenure 
on director performance remain unclear. Consequently the current regulatory debate over 
capped terms for directors is inadequately informed and limited evidence exists to support 
either argument. Our study set out to address current ambiguity in the broad area of director 
tenure by focusing on changes in director behaviour. While prior studies have considered the 
relationship between tenure and performance from an indirect and aggregated perspective, 
our findings come from an alternative perspective. Using an interpretive case-study design 
and a rich data set of interviews, observations and peer performance feedback we have been 
able to get close to the phenomena and directly investigate behaviours in the boardroom to 
understand whether and how director monitoring behaviours change over their time on a 
board.  
Our findings suggest there are common phases within a director’s tenure illustrated by 
figure 2 below. First, we found directors face a period of settling-in that may last between 6 
months and 2 years, before moving into a period of knowledge expansion where participation 
in board tasks expands from narrow to broad contribution. Variations exist however in the 
speed and extent to which director knowledge develops and only some directors from our data 
set were able to move into a further stage of leadership where information asymmetry is at 
the lowest level and capacity to monitor is highest. Finally we noted two triggers for 
monitoring decline. First, we observed early to mid-term directors become disengaged from 
board matters and second, monitoring by longer-term directors was at times obstructed by 
cognitive biases such as an attachment to the past.  
Effective monitors require both knowledge and independence (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Hambrick et al., 2015), yet the director tenure literature often positions these two 
essential characteristics in opposition. That is, a director’s tenure on a board is thought to 
increase knowledge while at the same time reduce independence from management. 
Combined these two effects suggest a trade-off is necessary between knowledge and 
independence. Our findings show these assumptions to be oversimplified and provide fresh 
insights into our understanding of how director monitoring behaviours change with tenure. 
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Figure 2: Stages of a director’s tenure and capacity to monitor 
 
Overall our findings show tenure does generally increase director knowledge, enhancing 
ability to judge and monitor management performance. However, our findings also suggest 
the relationship between knowledge and tenure is not always positive nor is it linear. For 
example, while it is commonly accepted that director human capital increases over a directors 
time on the board (Kosnik, 1990; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2008; Vafeas, 2003) our results 
describe multiple occasions where director participation remained limited to a discrete area 
of focus regardless of time spent on a board. Scholars have suggested director information 
processing capacity is a significant barrier to effective monitoring (Boivie, 2016; Tuggle et 
al., 2010). Our findings support this view, providing examples of where competing 
commitments outside the focal board’s industry restrict director knowledge developing.  
Despite a common acceptance within the literature and by regulators that tenure reduces 
director independence, we did not find support for this relationship. On the contrary, our 
results suggest longer-term directors monitor more intently due to their depth and breadth of 
knowledge along with high levels of confidence in confronting and challenging management. 
Finally, while we did not find evidence to support the notion that tenure reduces director’s 
independence; we identified two knowledge related factors that can inhibit monitoring 
capability. First we found instances of directors disengaging from board matters. This 
generally showed up in directors not preparing for meetings and willingness to accept the 
status quo. While a decline in monitoring is often associated with long-term directors, our 
finding indicate disengagement is also likely in early and mid-term directors.  Finally, our 
findings did find instances of reduced monitoring in long-term directors. However, rather than 
being independence related, we found this decline due to a cognitive bias stemming from 
attachment to past activities.  
Implications for theory 
Our findings contribute to the discussion on director independence antecedents. Independence 
is a critical element for effective monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Resultantly 
numerous studies have examined the relationship between board independence and firm 
performance. Within these studies tenure is used as a proxy for director independence. 
Surprisingly the timing of changes to a CEO’s tenure is often ignored from this relationship. 
Our findings indicate tenure alone is an unsuitable measure of independence. Some studies 
have applied an alternative measure of independence incorporating the concentration of board 
appointments before the CEO (De Villiers et al., 2011). We find this is a more appropriate 
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measure of director independence since the relationship between the CEO and a director is 
more relevant to the question of independence than tenure alone.  
Our second contribution is to the literature on director human capital. Human capital, an 
important contributor to effective board monitoring, is generally considered to increase with 
tenure. Our findings point to different forms of human capital such as board knowledge, firm 
knowledge and functional expertise. And while we found tenure does generally increase 
director human capital, we noted some aspects of human capital to be more closely linked to 
tenure. Furthermore, experiences – both prior to and while on the board - along with capacity 
to devote time and attention can expedite or restrict expansion in director human capital.  
Empirical studies examining changes in board composition often fail to take account for 
the time it takes for new directors to have a positive impact on board monitoring. Our findings 
suggest a period of settling-in may last between six months and two years during which 
involvement in board tasks may be low regardless of an individual’s background. This 
indicates a lag should be accounted for when modelling changes to human capital in board 
composition.  
Implications for practice 
Our research also has implications for practice. The debate over capped terms for directors 
has resulted in a number of regulators recommending maximum tenures. The case to limit 
non-executive director tenure stems from the logic that over time directors develop close ties 
to management, compromising their independence and ability to monitor objectively. 
However we found little support for this argument, in fact directors with prominent 
monitoring behaviours are often directors with more than ten years of tenure. This suggests 
that the one-size-fits-all approach that is often adopted for tenure may be inappropriate and 
could lead to boards retiring their most effective monitors. Finally, our findings suggest that 
any effect of tenure on independence is likely to be relationship dependent. Thus in 
considering director independence boards should consider the overlapping tenure of directors 
with management and with other directors, as these factors are likely to have more effect than 
tenure alone.  
Finally boards are facing pressure from regulators and shareholders to increase the number 
of independent directors. Some scholars have noted this shift comes at a disadvantage to 
boards through an increase in information asymmetry between the board and management 
(Castro et al., 2009; Forbes and Miliken, 1999). Our findings indicate that where overlapping 
tenures with the CEO or other directors is managed, long-term directors can remain objective 
while contributing experience and knowledge of a firm’s strategies and policies to the board, 
bridging the gap between inside and outside directors.  
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
Our study comes with some limitations that provide avenues for future research. First, the 
focus of this study has been on understanding the impact of director tenure at an individual 
level. Since the board is a group and monitoring is also a board function there are likely to be 
group effects in the relationship between director tenure and board monitoring effectiveness. 
Our findings point to the existence of group effects, for example tenure diversity may offset 
the effect of cognitive biases that come from prolonged tenure, however further exploration 
into this phenomena was beyond the scope of this study. We therefore suggest future studies 
could extend this work and complement our research by examining the effect of tenure on 
board monitoring at a group level. 
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Second, this study was conducted as a cross sectional study with interviews, observations 
and performance feedback taken at single point in time. Since tenure is a temporal 
phenomenon, added insights could come from conducting a similar study on a longitudinal 
basis. For example, a comparison of individual director behaviour over multiple time frames 
would provide added insight into how monitoring behaviour at a director and board level 
changes over time. Alternatively future studies could further examine the relationship 
between tenure and independence using longitudinal data to consider how director monitoring 
behaviours change when a CEO is replaced.  
Third, we chose to study boards operating within the same industry. This enabled us to 
control for industry effects and environmental differences. Replication of our study in other 
contexts would provide added input as to the general applicability. Finally, an important 
source of our data was boardroom observations. A number of confounding effects and 
problems has been noted in using observational data that can make it difficult to establish 
causal relationships (Chaffin et al., 2016). However this method has the distinct advantage of 
being able to directly observe the effect of director tenure on director monitoring behaviours 
and provided us a mechanism to validate the accounts and experiences expressed by the 
participants to our study.  
Conclusion 
Effective monitors require both incentives and ability (Hambrick et al., 2015; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). It is thought that when a director first joins a board they are disadvantaged in 
their ability to monitor by their limited knowledge of the firms activities, while longer serving 
directors face challenges in their ability to monitor through reduced independence. Our results 
indicate that the relationship between a director’s time on a board and their capacity to 
monitoring is far more complex. Our findings show the relationship between director tenure 
and director monitoring is dependent not only on length of service but also on their 
experiences prior to and once on a board as well as on their competing commitments. And 
while long serving directors may be challenged in their capacity monitor, the cause is more 
likely to be cognitive and motivational rather than independence related. 
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Appendix A: Interview protocol 
A) Tenure interviews 
a. Do you think your time on the board has changed your ability to question and challenge 
management?  
i.  In what ways? Do you feel more or less empowered to monitor management?  
 
b. Do you think your time on the board has changed your willingness to question and challenge 
management?  
i.  In what ways? Do you feel more or less empowered to monitor management?  
 
c. Do you think your tenure has altered your ability to remain objective? 
i. In what ways? 
 
d. Have you noticed changes in the contributions made by other board members over their time 
on the board? 
i. Can you be specific [ie. relate to each director]? 
 
B) Peer-performance feedback interviews 
The following sequence is applied to each director: 
a. On a scale of 1 to 10, how does [Director’s name] perform? (Inform participants that this 
score remains confidential – it just allows us to understand where you see the performance 
of the director) 
b. Why do you say they are a [insert score from (a) above)?  
c. What are they doing well? 
d. What would they have to do to move to a [score from (a) +1]? 
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Appendix B: Observation schedule 
 
 
